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Abstract (150-250 words) 
 
Avoiding human overtrust in machines is a vital issue to establish a socially 
acceptable Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS).  However, research 
has not clarified the effective way of designing an ADAS to prevent driver 
overtrust in the system.  It is necessary to develop a theoretical framework that is 
useful to understand how a human trust becomes excessive.  This paper proposes 
a trust model by which overtrust can be clearly defined.  It is shown that at least 
three types of overtrust are distinguished on the basis of the model.  As an 
example, this paper discusses human overtrust in an Adaptive Cruise Control 
(ACC) system.  By conducting an experiment on a medium-fidelity driving 
simulator, we observed two types of overtrust among the three.  The first one is 
that some drivers relied on the ACC system beyond its limit of decelerating 
capability.  The second one is that a driver relied on the ACC systems by 
expecting that it could decelerate against a stopped vehicle.  It is estimated 
through data analysis how those kinds of overtrust emerged.  Furthermore, 
possible ways for prevention of human overtrust in ADAS are discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Driver assistance systems are getting powerful and intelligent enough to 
control a vehicle.  For example, Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) systems (ISO, 
2002) may perform longitudinal control to maintain the vehicle speed as directed 
by the driver if there is not a slow preceding vehicle, and to maintain the time gap 
to the preceding vehicle appropriately if there is one.  ACC systems are useful to 
reduce driver mental workload so that the risk of the rear-end collision could be 
reduced as a result (see, e.g., Ma and Kaber, 2005; Young and Stanton, 2004).  
Also, automatic brake systems for collision avoidance have been studied 
(Coelingh, Eidehall, and Bengtsson, 2010; Isermann, Mannale, and Schmitt, 2010; 
Kaempchen, Schiele, and Dietmayer, 2009; Wada, Doi, Tsuru, Isaji, and Kaneko, 
2010).  Recently, automatic brake systems that work in the low-speed range have 
been putting into market (see, e.g., Distner, Bengtsson, Broberg, and Jakobsson 
(2009)).   
However, the capability of a driver assistance system is essentially limited 
in some way.  For example, a conventional ACC system does not apply the brake 
against stationary objects, which include a stopped vehicle at the tail end of a 
traffic jam.  The main reason for ignoring stationary objects on the road is that a 
laser-radar in an ACC system for target vehicle detection can not distinguish 
reflectors on the guardrails from that on the tail of forward vehicles.  In order to 
avoid unnecessary braking against reflectors on the guardrails, ACC systems 
should ignore reflectors not moving or whose relative speed with the host vehicle 
is very big.  The speed threshold to ignore the preceding vehicle would depend 
on car models, and the exact threshold value is sometimes confidential.  
However, some carmakers disclose the threshold value via the owner’s manual.  
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For example, one commercialized ACC system in Japan ignores a slowly moving 
object whose speed is below 20km/h.  No systems can be free from this kind of 
capability limitation.  Nilsson (1995) found in a simulator experiment that some 
drivers failed to intervene when approaching a stopped queue of vehicles because 
they believed that the ACC could effectively respond to the situation.  Larsson 
(2011) found that users of an ACC system in the real world did not understand the 
limitation of the ACC system adequately.  Avoiding driver overtrust in 
automation is thus important for attaining safety in the automobile domain. 
Overtrust has been one of important issues in human factors (see, e.g., 
Parasuraman and Riley, 1997).  It seems that overtrust in automation is closely 
related issues of "risk compensation" (Wilde, 1994) or "behavioral adaptation" 
(OECD, 1990).  A driver may change his or her behavior into riskier one 
intentionally based on the recognition of risk reduction given by an automated 
system if the driver places his or her trust in the system very much (Itoh, Sakami, 
and Tanaka, 2007; Rudin-Brown and Parker, 2004).  However, the driver 
behavioral adaptation depends on driving style (Hoedeaeker and Brookhuis, 
1998).  The notion of overtrust is also related to issues of "complacency."  Even 
though discussions on defining complacency have not ended (see, e.g., 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens, 2008), the term complacency refers to lack 
of vigilance (Moray and Inagaki, 2000) rather than intentional behavioral change 
towards compensation of the risk.  According to Singh, Molloy and Parasuraman 
(1993), the tendency to be complacent is also dependent on the human attitude.   
Even a vigilant human, on the other hand, may still trust an automation too 
much if he or she misunderstands what the automation can do (Itoh, 2010).  In 
fact, Ockerman and Pritchett (2000) discussed professional workers' over-reliance 
on task guidance systems.   
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Unfortunately, it has not been established the way of avoiding driver 
overtrust in automation.  It would be because that it has not been fully 
understood why human overtrust in automation occurs.  Even though huge 
number of studies have been done for modeling of human trust in automation (see, 
e.g., Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, and Dawe, 2002; Lee and Moray, 1992; Lee and 
See, 2004; Muir 1994; Sheridan 1992), the focus of many tends to be acceptance 
and promoting trust.  The relationship between overtrust and trust has been 
hardly discussed.  Although Lee and See (2004) discussed trust calibration, but 
the multidimensional aspects of trust were not taken into account in the paper.  
As has been pointed out, there exist multiple dimensions of trust in automation 
(Lee and Moray, 1992; Muir, 1994).  The dimensions should be taken into 
account in the theory on overtrust in automation. 
This paper proposes a model of human trust in automation which can give 
a clear definition of overtrust in automation.  In order to develop design 
guidelines for prevention of overtrust, it is necessary to understand how human 
overtrust emerges.  This paper conducts an experiment by using a driving 
simulator and analyzes the change of driver behavior.   
 
 
2 Model of Trust and Overtrust 
 
2.1 Trust and trustworthiness 
 
[Definition 1: Trustworthiness of Automation] 
Let S be a random variable representing a current situation in which an 
automated system is going to work.  The random variable S can take on an 
element of 

Sd  s1,s2, ,sNd  that is the set of all possible and mutually 
exclusive situations in which the automation is designed to work.  The 
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probability that the situation si occurs is represented as 

Pd (S  si), where the 
subscript d represents the probability comes from the design of the system 
(Apparently, 

Pd (S  si)
i1
Nd
 1.).  Event A represents that the automation 
carries out its required function, Fa, successfully.  The objective trustworthiness 
of the automation under condition S can be expressed as the probability of A under 
situation S, i.e., 

Pd (A | S) .  Thus, the overall trustworthiness of the automation, 

Td , is defined as follows: 
 

Td  Pd (A | S  si)Pd (S  si)
i1
Nd
                           (1) 
 
 If the automation is designed and manufactured appropriately, the value of 

Td  should be one.  However, 

Td  can be less than one due to unforeseen factors 
or events.  
 For example, let us think about the deceleration by an ACC system.  
Suppose the maximum deceleration rate of the ACC system is 0.25G, and every 
situation can be categorized into one of the following cases in terms of the 
necessary deceleration rate of the host vehicle:  
 s1: 0.05 G is enough,  
 s2: more than 0.05 G is necessary but 0.15 G is enough, and  
 s3: more than 0.15 G is necessary but 0.25 G is enough.  
Suppose the ACC system works perfectly in situations s1 and s2 (i.e., 

Pd (A | S  s1)  Pd (A | S  s2) 1), but sometimes fails to decelerate at 0.25G 
at an s3 situation.  If the failure occurs once in a 10 occurrences of s3 and the 
probabilities of occurrence of s1, s2, and s3 are 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2, respectively, the 
total trustworthiness of the ACC system 

Td  is obtained as follows: 
 

Td 10.510.3 0.90.2  0.98 
It is true that there exist situations where more than 0.25G is necessary as the 
deceleration rate to avoid a collision, but those situations are out of the scope of 
the system.  Therefore, the incapability of the ACC system beyond the brake 
limit does not affect the trustworthiness of the system.  
 
[Definition 2: Human Operator’s Trust in Automation] 
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Let S’ be a random variable representing a current situation in which the 
human operator expects that the automated system is going to work.  The 
random variable S’ can take on an element of 

Sh  s 1, s 2, , s Nh  that is the 
set of all possible and mutually exclusive situations in which the human operator 
regards the automation may work well.  The probability that the situation s’i 
occurs is represented as 

Ph( S  s i), where the subscript h represents the 
probability is estimated by the human operator, and again, 

Ph (S  si ' )i1
Nh 1.).  
Suppose the human operator’s degree of belief on trustworthiness of the 
automation under situation S’ is expressed as a subjective probability denoted by 

Ph("A"| S ) , where “A” represents that the human operator expects the automation 
carries out its expected function, Fh, under situation S’ successfully.  The human 
operator’s overall trust in the automation, 

Th , is defined as follows: 
 

Th  Ph ("A"| S  s i)Ph ( S  s i)
i1
Nh
                           (2) 
 
Note here that 

Sd  Sh  in general.   
 
 The above definitions of the automation trustworthiness and the human 
trust in the automation imply that the 100% trust does not always mean overtrust.  
If the trustworthiness is perfect, it would be appropriate that a human operator 
trusts the automation completely.  Such trust is never excessive. 
 Again, let us think about the deceleration by the ACC system.  Suppose a 
driver regards that the maximum deceleration rate of the ACC system is 
approximately 0.2G, and categorizes situations as follows:  
 s'1: 0.1 G is enough, and 
 s’2: more than 0.1G is necessary but 0.2 G is enough. 
Suppose the driver has experienced up to 0.2G deceleration of the ACC system, 
and the system has worked perfectly so that the driver has been satisfied with the 
ACC system (i.e., 

Ph("A"| S  s 1)  Ph("A"| S  s 2) 1).  If the subjective 
probabilities of s’1 and s’2 are 0.6 and 0.4, respectively, the overall f trust 

Th  is 
obtained as follows: 
 

Th 10.610.4 1.0 
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Apparently, this should not be regarded as overtrust.  
 
2.2 Overtrust  
 
 How can human operator overtrust in automation be defined?  It could be 
regarded as overtrust if 

Th  Td  in some cases.  However, as shown in the 
examples in section 2.1, the fact 

Th  Td  itself does not always mean overtrust.  
Moreover, it is difficult to develop useful countermeasures even if we notice the 
occurrence of overtrust by knowing 

Th  Td .  Based on the definitions 1 and 2, 
this paper regards the human operator’s trust as excessive if at least one of the 
following conditions is satisfied.  
(i) 

Ph("A"| S  s)  Pd (A | S  s), where 

s Sd  
(ii) 

Sh  Sd  (null set)  
(iii) Fh is not equivalent to Fa.  
Note here that the case (i) should be impossible if 

s Sd , because the 
value of 

Pd (A | S  s) should be one in that situation in principle.  In reality, 
however, it would be possible that 

Pd (A | S  s) is less than one even if 

s Sd .  
The overtrust in this sense is related to the lack or reduced vigilance against 
system malfunctioning.  However, the principal task here is to improve the 
system reliability.  
Case (ii) means that the human operator expects the automation carries out 
its function beyond the situations specified in the system design.  A typical 
example is that a driver expects that an ACC system can prevent a rear-end crash 
when the necessary deceleration is higher than the maximum deceleration rate of 
the ACC system.  The overtrust here is related to the "performance" dimension 
of trust (Lee and Moray, 1992).  This type of overtrust has been observed in 
several studies (see, e.g., Itoh, 2007; Seppelt and Lee, 2007).  It is hypothesized 
that this type of overtrust is caused by driver's direct extrapolation of subjective 
expectation of system capability from the previous experience to the non-
experienced situations.  That is, the increase of Ph("A"|s’i) results in the increase 
of Ph("A"|’sj), where s’i is in Sh but s’j is not.  We call this expansion of driver 
expectation a ripple effect.  Such ripple effects were observed in a very simple 
experiment in a process control system (Itoh, Inahashi, and Tanaka, 2003).  
9 
However, it is not clear whether such ripple effects occur in a realistic situation of 
car driving.   
Case (iii) represents that the human misunderstands the function of the 
automation and he/she expects the work that the automation is not designed to 
provide.  This is related to "purpose" dimension of trust (Lee & Moray, 1992).  
A typical example of such overtrust is driver expectation to an ACC system to 
decelerate against a stopped vehicle at the tail end of a traffic jam.  Dickie and 
Boyle (2009) showed that many drivers were not familiar with this limitation.  
What happens if a driver comes to a stopped vehicle at the tail end of a traffic 
jam?  Does the driver overtrust appear?  If so, what are the contributing factors 
for the overtrust?  It is necessary to conduct an experiment to find answers to the 
questions. 
 
 
3 Experiment 
 
3.1 Purpose  
 The purpose of the experiment is to test whether driver overtrust in an 
ACC system can be observed in driving simulator experimental conditions.  If 
yes, it is also necessary to clarify reasons why such overtrust occurs, in order to 
establish methodologies for prevention of overtrust. 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twelve drivers (six females and six males) between the ages of 26-55 
years (mean = 37.0, s.d.=8.6) participated in this experiment.  Every participant 
had a valid driver’s license and drove daily.  The driving experience was more 
than 10 years for every participant except one who had been a licensed driver for 
less than one year.   
 
3.2.2 Apparatus 
 A fixed-base driving simulator was used in this study (Fig. 1).  It has a 
nearly straight, two-lane, and endless expressway.  Three 100-inch screens are 
set in front of the driver and the field of view is approximately 120 degrees.  An 
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ACC system is installed in this driving simulator.  The main characteristics of 
the ACC system are as follows: 
 The ACC system controls the vehicle speed at the target level set by the 
driver when there is no lead vehicle ahead.  The system maintains the safe 
headway distance when a lead vehicle exists.   
 The ACC system can be activated and work from 5km/h to 100km/h.  The 
driver has to apply the brake for the full stop.  
 The ACC system is activated only if the driver presses the activate button 
near the steering wheel, but can be deactivated by pushing the cancel button 
or by pressing the brake pedal.   
 A visual icon appears on the control panel including the speed meter while 
the system recognizes the lead vehicle.  The icon disappears if the lead 
vehicle is lost.  It is assumed that no error occurs in the system for the 
detection of a lead vehicle and the estimation of the headway distance and 
the relative speed.   
 The maximum system acceleration rate is 0.15 G, and the maximum system 
deceleration rate is 0.25 G.  Neither auditory nor visual information is given 
even when the ACC system is conducting the maximum brake (Note: This is 
not the standard configuration of ACC systems.  In the real world, ACC 
systems may provide some information to driver at the maximum 
deceleration.  The reason for not issuing an alert in this experiment was to 
avoid driver simple reaction to the alert.). 
 The ACC system can not detect stationary objects.  No assistance is given 
against the stationary objects on the road.  
   
************************************* 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
************************************* 
 
3.2.3 Task, experimental design, and procedure 
The participants were instructed to drive safely on the left-hand lane of 
the expressway by using the ACC system as much as possible.  At the end of a 
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drive, the host vehicle comes to the tail end of a heavy traffic jam.  All vehicles 
in front are stopped.  When the host vehicle fully stops, the trial ends.   
In terms of the situation before arriving at the tail end of the traffic jam, 
six scenarios (five 5-min drive scenarios from A1 to A5 and one 20-min drive 
scenario named B) were distinguished:   
A1: The host vehicle was running at a cruise speed and came close to the 
slow lead vehicle running at 50 km/h.  After following the lead vehicle at 
50km/h for a while, the host vehicle loses the lead vehicle because the lead 
vehicle changes lanes just before arriving at the tail end of the traffic jam.  The 
ACC system in the host vehicle is still active even after losing the lead vehicle, 
but the system does not provide any help against the stopped vehicles ahead.  
The driver in the host vehicle should apply the brake by him/herself for rear-end 
collision avoidance.   
A2: After free cruising, the host vehicle came close to a vehicle whose 
speed was 50km/h and made following for a while.  Then the lead vehicle 
decelerates at 0.1G and finally stops because of the traffic jam.  The ACC system 
in the host vehicle decreases the vehicle speed accordingly and successfully.  At 
least, the driver in the host vehicle has to apply the brake for stopping when the 
vehicle speed becomes below 5km/h. 
A3: The host vehicle was following the lead vehicle at 100km/h.  The 
lead vehicle decelerates at 0.1G upon detecting the traffic jam and finally stops.  
The ACC system in the host vehicle decreases the vehicle speed accordingly and 
successfully.  At least, the driver in the host vehicle has to apply the brake for the 
stopping. 
A4: The host vehicle was following the lead vehicle at 100km/h.  The 
lead vehicle decelerates at 0.2G upon detecting the traffic jam and finally stops.  
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The ACC system may apply almost its maximum brake against the lead vehicle 
deceleration, but anyway it is successful.  Again, the driver in the host vehicle 
has to apply the brake for stopping. 
A5: The host vehicle was following the lead vehicle at 100km/h.  The 
lead vehicle decelerates at 0.35G upon detecting the traffic jam and finally stops.  
Even though the ACC system applies its maximum brake, a rear-end crash can not 
be avoided only by the system brake.  The driver has to intervene into the control 
as soon as possible. 
B: The host vehicle was following the lead vehicle at 100km/h.  Before 
arriving at the tail end of the traffic jam, the lead vehicle changes lanes.  The 
ACC system in the host vehicle is still active even after losing the lead vehicle, 
but the system does not provide any help against the stopped vehicles ahead.  
The driver in the host vehicle should apply the brake by him/herself for rear-end 
collision avoidance.   
The ACC system works perfectly as it is designed, no malfunction 
occurs in the system.  However, the participants did not receive any information 
on the reliability of the ACC system at all.  The participants were informed that 
there is a limitation of the deceleration rate given by the ACC system but not 
informed the actual value of the limitation.  No information was given to the 
participants on the system behavior against stopped objects.   
Every participant received all six scenarios in the data collection.  A 
trial has one scenario.  The number of trials for each scenario and the order of 
scenarios are shown in Table 1.  The numbers of the scenarios are not balanced: 
ordinary decelerations of the lead vehicle, such as 0.1G, are many, but the rapid 
decelerations, such as 0.35G, are few. 
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************************************* 
Insert Table 1 about here 
************************************* 
 
The experiment lasted four days for each participant.  In each day, it took 
approximately one hour depending on the number of trials to be completed.  On 
the first day, participants were given opportunities for practice so that they could 
become familiar with the simulator and with the ACC system.  There were 
neither rapid decelerations of the lead vehicle nor stopped objects in the practice 
drives.  The practice drives were done until the driver felt that he or she had 
obtained enough skill for driving on the simulator.  In the data collection, a short 
break was given every 6 or 7 trials for every participant depending on the driver 
state.  Before conducting scenario B on the fourth day, every driver was given a 
short break.  The participants were informed of neither the number of trials in a 
day nor the content in each scenario so as to avoid the driver’s unnecessary 
prediction of events in the trials.  We were concerned that participants might 
“predict” something wrong may happen at the final trial on the last day. 
 
3.2.4 Dependent variables 
 In this paper, one of the most important dependent variables is the number 
of rear-end collisions.   
 In order to investigate how driver attitude toward the ACC system changed 
through his or her repetitive use of it, we analyze driver brake timing in type A 
scenarios from the first day to the last day.  An appropriate index for discussing 
the brake timing depends on scenarios.  For scenarios A1 and B, Time To 
Collision (TTC) against the stopped vehicle at the tail end of the traffic jam would 
be an appropriate one.  For scenarios A2, A3, A4, and A5, TTC against the lead 
vehicle to follow may not be appropriate, because the value of TTC becomes huge 
if a driver waits until the vehicle speed becomes below 5km/h (minimum working 
speed of the ACC system).  Instead, the host vehicle speed at the driver brake 
would be the appropriate one.  If the vehicle speed at the braking is large (small), 
the brake timing can be regarded as early (late).     
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3.3 Results and discussions 
No crashes occurred in the total 24 cases (2 trials/participant * 12 
participants) of scenario A1 trials.  Among 84 cases of A5 in which the lead 
vehicle decelerated rapidly, three crashes occurred.  Participants #1, #4, and #12 
caused a crash for each.  For scenario B, there was one crash caused by 
participant #11 among 12 cases.  According to surveillance of video images of 
the driver face at the crashes, the four crash-experienced participants were not 
drowsy, not distracted, but looked forward.  Fig. 2 shows the values of 1/THW 
and 1/TTC at the driver brake onset.  Goodrich and Boer (2003) suggest that 
driver risk perception on a rear-end collision can be described with the 
combination of THW and TTC.  On the basis of that, Kondoh, Yamamura,  
Kitazaki, Kuge, and Boer (2008) investigated real world driver braking behavior 
and showed that the value of RF=1/THW+4/TTC tends to be lower than two at the 
driver brake onset in ordinary situations (Note: RF represents “Risk Feeling.”).  
The data shown in Fig. 2 suggest that the driver brake in the crash cases was late.   
 
************************************* 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
************************************* 
 
Thus, it can be claimed that the reliance of the crash-experienced 
participants on the ACC system was too high at the crash.  For the crash cases in 
type A5, their reliance on the ACC system was excessive in the sense that they let 
the ACC system brake when the necessary deceleration rate was beyond the limit 
of the system capability.  On the other hand, the reliance on the system was 
excessive in the sense that the crashed participant misunderstood the purpose of 
the system.  According to the comments given at the interview after the 
experiment, the participant expected the ACC system to reduce the vehicle speed 
to some extent at that situation, but in fact, the system never applies the brake 
against the stopped vehicle.   
Why did the crashes occur?  How we can reduce the risk of such crashes?  
As has been shown in Fig. 2 (a), the lack of information on the boundary of the 
system capability does not always cause a crash.  Other contributing factor(s) 
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is/are necessary for occurrences of crashes.  This paper focuses on effects of 
successful use of the ACC system under peaceful situations, i.e., we investigate 
how driver behavior changed on the basis of driving experience with the ACC 
system.  Concretely speaking, how the timing of driver brake, which means 
driver takeover of control from the ACC system, is changed on the basis of 
repetitive use of the ACC system.  Fig. 3 shows the time series of driver brake 
timing for each scenario type.  Fig. 3 suggests the followings: 
(1) Scenario A3.  The crash-experienced participants, #1, #4, #12, and 
#11, were very reliant on the ACC system.  Among non-crash experienced 
participants, there were two participants, #5 and #7, who were not willing to use 
the ACC system.  It seems that the two participants developed their rule to 
intervene into control; they applied the brake immediately upon detecting 
deceleration of the preceding vehicle instead of letting the system brake.  For the 
remaining participants, the brake timing in trials of scenario A3 became late 
gradually.  The ACC system was worth relying for those participants except #5 
and #7 in that situation.    
(2) Scenario A5.  Experience of a crash or a near-miss at a trial made 
brake timing earlier at least for the next several trials, where a near-miss refers to 
a case in which RF > 2 at the driver braking.  The experience of a crash or a 
near-miss makes a driver attentive.   
(3) Scenario A4.  The experience of a crash or a near-miss in a type A5 
trial makes the driver brake timing earlier in the type A4 trial just after the crash 
or the near miss.   
 
************************************* 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
************************************* 
 
There was a tendency that the brake timing at scenario B was early for the 
participants who were not willing to use the ACC system (#5 and #7) and who 
experienced a crash in a trial of A5 scenario (#1, #4, and #12), compared to the 
other participants (Fig. 4).  The reason why the brake timing of participants #1, 
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#4, and #12 was early would be that their attention was aroused by the experience 
of the crash in a type A5 trial. 
 
************************************* 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
************************************* 
 
In summary, it would be possible to categorize the participants as shown in 
Fig. 5.  The questions here are: (1) What are the differences between the three 
crash-experienced participants in a trial of scenario A5 (#1, #4, and #12) and the 
other 10 participants who were willing to use the ACC system, and (2) What are 
the differences between participant #11 and the remaining six?  
 
************************************* 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
************************************* 
 
In order to answer to the first question, the following analyses were done.  
A t-test was conducted to compare the brake timing in A3 trials between the three 
crash-experienced participants and the remaining 7 participants.  The result 
showed that there was a statistically significant difference between them (t(442)=-
4.6, p<0.01).  A t-test on the brake timing in A4 trials between the three crash-
experienced and the seven non-experienced showed a significant difference 
between them (t(212)=-3.3, p<0.01).  The crashes in A5 trials occurred due to 
the delay in driver braking.   
Thus, the reliance on the ACC system can be illustrated as shown in Fig. 
6(a).  Fig. 6(b) depicts a quantitative estimation of the reliance.  In Fig. 6(b), a 
point represents the mean value of the estimated willingness levels to rely on the 
ACC system in the corresponding participant group (crash-experienced: #1, #4, 
#11, and 12, not crash-experienced: others), and the error bar represents the 
standard deviation.  The estimated willingness level (WL) is derived as WL = 1 - 
(the vehicle speed at braking) /100, where the unit of the vehicle speed at braking 
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is km/h, and the value is obtained from the final trial of the corresponding 
scenario (A3: Day #4, Trial #13, A4: Day #4, Trial #7, and A5: Day #4, Trial 
#11).   
Moreover, the correlation between a brake timing at an A5 trial and the 
brake timing at the preceding A4 trial of the A5 trial was 0.54 (p<0.05) (Fig. 7).  
On the basis of the above results, it could be claimed that an experience at a 
condition may affect the willingness to rely on the ACC system at another 
condition as shown in Fig. 8.  Concretely speaking, the experience of the success 
of ACC increases not only the reliance on the system at A4 but also the reliance 
on the system at A5.  This effect was stronger for the crash-experienced 
participants than for the other participants.  Note here that the ripple effect model 
shown in Fig. 8 has not been verified in a quantitative manner.  Further research 
is necessary to develop a model which is able to describe the dynamics of the 
trust.  
 
************************************* 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
************************************* 
************************************* 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
************************************* 
************************************* 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
************************************* 
 
As for the second question, participant #11 had relied on the ACC system 
until it became deactivated in almost all A3 trials (Fig. 3(a)), but the remaining six 
had not (Fig. 3(b)).  The brake timing of participant #11 in A5 became late 
gradually (Fig. 3(e)), but that of the other six did not.  This increase of 
participant#11’s reliance on the ACC system in scenario A5 may have a strong 
relationship with the reliance on the system in scenario B.   
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Participant #11 was closer to #1, #4, and #12 than to the other six drivers.  
It was common for the four participants in the sense that they became reliant on 
the ACC system too much in A5 trials.  The difference between participant #11 
and participants #1, #4, and #12 was that the former experienced neither a crash 
nor a near-miss in A5 trials due to the gradual increase of the reliance.  It is thus 
possible that the participants #1, #4, and #12 caused a crash in scenario B if they 
had faced scenario B before they experienced the crash in an A5 trial.   
 
4 Conclusions 
 
 This paper proposed a model of human trust in automation for discussing 
overtrust.  It is necessary to distinguish at least overtrust in terms of performance 
from overtrust in terms of purpose.   
The results of the experiment suggest that increase of trust in a system at 
some working condition may cause a ripple effect to trust in it in more difficult 
working conditions.  The ripple effect seems very natural but has hardly been 
observed in previous experimental studies on human-machine cooperation.  
Overtrust due to misunderstanding of the system purpose was also observed in 
this experiment.  According to the investigation of driver behavior, the false 
expectation towards the ACC system to decelerate against a "stopped" lead 
vehicle may be strongly related to the repetitive driver observations of successful 
system behavior against a "stopping" lead vehicle.   
How can we apply the observations to system design for prevention of 
human overtrust in automation?  Essentially, the ripple effect would be 
inevitable in the process of development of human trust in automation, because 
trust in another person often emerges like that.  For example, a human supervisor 
asks a human subordinate to do an easy task.  After observing that the 
subordinate completes the task successfully, the supervisor may expect that the 
subordinate will be able to do a more difficult task.  The ripple effect is adequate 
in a human-human relationship because the skill of a subordinate may be 
developed gradually.  It may not be appropriate, on the other hand, for a human 
to expand the subjective limit of automation capability on the basis of the 
experience, because an automated system does not grow as a human does.  An 
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automated system should provide information on the purpose of the system and 
the limit of its capability in a clear manner.   
Stanton and Young (2005) suggested the necessity of visual information 
for driver prediction of system behavior.  Seppelt and Lee (2007) proposed an 
ecological interface display which makes the limits of an ACC system visible to 
the driver.  Itoh (2008) proposed a method of displaying the limit of deceleration 
capability of an ACC system on the instrumental panel for preventing overtrust in 
terms of performance.  However, the methodologies for prevention of overtrust 
due to misunderstanding of the purpose have not been established.  Further 
studies are necessary to clarify whether overtrust in terms of purpose can be 
prevented by an appropriate design of human interface or human-machine 
interaction, or whether only education or training is the practical solution.   
Note that it is still unclear whether or not overtrust observed in this paper 
really occurs in the real world.  This is because a part of the configuration of the 
ACC system in this study is different from the real one.  For example, the ACC 
system used in this study does not give any alert at the maximum braking.  
Further studies are necessary to observe driver behavior in the real world.   
In this paper, the theoretical model of trust in automation proposed in 
section 2 was used only for discussing what kinds of overtrust are possible.  
However, the model itself has a potential to describe how the trust emerges.  
Further studies are necessary to investigate whether or not the overall trust in 
automation is really derived by formula (2).  Another problem rises here.  It 
might be possible that a human operator is not able to provide a subjective 
probability which satisfies the probability axioms.  One possibility to overcome 
this problem is to apply the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Shafer, 1976) 
which is suitable for describing human subjective feeling to which the probability 
theory is difficult to apply (Itoh, 2001).   
Quantitative formalization of the ripple effect is also necessary.  One way 
for this is to apply the model of dynamic change of trust proposed by Gao, Lee, 
and Zhang (2006).  However, the application of the model of Gao et al. is not 
straightforward.  The formalized quantitative modeling of dynamics of trust will 
be discussed in a different paper.  
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Table 1 Experiencing order of scenarios 
Trial # Day #1 Day #2 Day #3 Day #4 
1 A3 A3 A3 A3 
2 A4 A3 A4 A4 
3 A3 A4 A3 A3 
4 A3 A3 A2 A4 
5 A4 A2 A3 A3 
6 A3 A4 A4 A2 
7 A4 A3 A3 A4 
8 A3 A3 A5 A1 
9 A5 A4 A3 A3 
10 A3 A2 A4 A3 
11 A4 A5 A3 A5 
12 A3 A3 A1 A3 
13 A4 A4 A3 A3 
14 A3 A3 A3 B 
15 A5 A4 A2 
 
16 A3 A3 A4 
17 A3 A3 A3 
18 
 
A3 A5 
19 A5 A3 
20  A4 
26 
 
Fig. 1 The driving simulator used in the experiment 
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0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
1/THW (1/s)
1
/T
T
C
 (
1
/s
)
crash
crash
crash
 
(b) Scenario A5 
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(c) Scenario B 
Figure 2 Driver brake timing in risky situations 
 
 
28 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1_
1
1_
3
1_
4
1_
6
1_
8
1_
10
1_
12
1_
14
1_
16
1_
17 2_
1
2_
2
2_
4
2_
7
2_
8
2_
12
2_
14
2_
16
2_
17
2_
18 3_
1
3_
3
3_
5
3_
7
3_
9
3_
11
3_
13
3_
14
3_
17
3_
19 4_
1
4_
3
4_
5
4_
9
4_
10
4_
12
4_
13
Trial number
V
e
h
ic
le
s
p
e
e
d
 a
t 
b
ra
k
in
g
 (
m
/s
e
c
)
E1
E6
F5
F6
 
(a) scenario A3 (crash-experienced) 
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(b) scenario A3 (not crash-experienced) 
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(c) scenario A4 (crash-experienced) 
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(d) scenario A4 (not crash-experienced) 
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(e) scenario A5 (crash-experienced) 
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(f) scenario A5 (not crash-experienced) 
Figure 3 Driver brake timing for each scenario 
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Fig. 4 TTC at driver braking in scenario B 
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Fig. 5 Categorization of participants 
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(b) estimated model 
 
Fig. 6 Difference in the reliance on the ACC system between #1, #4, and 
#12 (experienced a crash in a A5 trial) and the others 
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Fig. 7 Relationship between brake timings in an A5 trial and in its 
preceding A4 trial 
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Fig. 8  The ripple effect 
 
